Online Opposition in Singapore: Communications Outreach Without Electoral Gain more

This article was downloaded by: [Gomez, James] On: 10 October 2008 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 903551823] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Contemporary Asia Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t776095547 Online Opposition in Singapore: Communications Outreach Without Electoral Gain James Gomez a a Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, Victoria, Australia Online Publication Date: 01 November 2008 To cite this Article Gomez, James(2008)'Online Opposition in Singapore: Communications Outreach Without Electoral Gain',Journal of Contemporary Asia,38:4,591 — 612 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/00472330802311779 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472330802311779 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Journal of Contemporary Asia Vol. 38, No. 4, November 2008, pp. 591–612 Online Opposition in Singapore: Communications Outreach Without Electoral Gain JAMES GOMEZ Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, Victoria, Australia Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 ABSTRACT The internet’s public availability in Singapore has fostered a belief among opposition parties in the city-state that the internet will provide them with a new tool of external outreach to overcome local media bias and make electoral gains against the ruling People’s Action Party. Ten years after the first opposition party went online, Singapore’s opposition parties’ online presence is small, its online external outreach weak and their electoral fortunes remain unchanged. Why is this so? This article argues that a do-it-yourself approach, technical challenges, a culture of caution and the parties’ control over its members’ online communications are the chief reasons why their use of the internet for external outreach has been less than optimal. The article concludes that the internet provides opposition parties an additional external outreach medium. However, that outreach has not helped improve their electoral success. This shows that relying on the internet does not yield electoral advantage. KEY WORDS: Singapore, elections, internet, media, opposition parties Early researchers studying political parties and online communications in Singapore believed that the internet would present opposition parties with a tool of external outreach that could overcome local media censorship and bias. By using this new tool of external outreach, they felt that opposition parties could mount an effective electoral challenge to the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) hold on political power of nearly fifty years. For instance, one non-governmental organisation (NGO) compilation on Singapore’s political parties, despite its scanty data about the use of the internet by opposition parties, made a bold and challenging claim that the use of the internet by opposition parties would pose a challenge to the PAP government’s media control (Ooi, 1998). Another study, again based on limited evidence, asserted that the internet did make inroads into government media control during the 1997 general election (da Cunha, 1997). Mutalib’s (2003) study of the opposition also stressed the importance of the internet. However, beyond statements that easy access to the internet will encourage political parties to set up homepages, Mutalib provided no analysis of whether the new technology was likely to have any impact on the electoral fortunes of the opposition parties in Singapore. Correspondence Address: James Gomez, Monash Asia Institute, 8th Floor South, Menzies Building (11), Monash University, Victoria, 3800, Australia. Email: james@jamesgomeznews.com ISSN 0047-2336 Print/1752-7554 Online/08/040591-22 Ó 2008 Journal of Contemporary Asia DOI: 10.1080/00472330802311779 592 J. Gomez In a 2002 study, researchers concluded that ‘‘sites’’ of resistance in Singapore tend to use the internet to focus attention on issues that were rejected or downplayed by traditional media (Ho et al., 2002: 137, 141). The study also highlighted that these sites used the internet to refute mainstream statements by providing alternative explanations. However, opposition parties formed only a very small part of the study as only two parties, the Workers’ Party (WP) and National Solidarity Party (NSP), were mentioned. Hence, the findings of this study cannot be extended convincingly to all opposition parties. To date there has not been a single exclusive study on opposition parties and internet in Singapore. Instead, only minor discussions on the topic, such as those reviewed above, have been recorded. These opinions about the internet and opposition parties can be found generally within specific works that discuss Singapore’s general elections, the opposition or civil society use of the internet. Collectively, these works demonstrate an attempt to examine and analyse the potential the internet holds for opposition parties to overcome lack of access to local media and its inherent bias. But given that the study of opposition party websites are either scattered or combined with studies on civil society’s use of the internet, there is scope to undertake a comprehensive study that looks exclusively at opposition parties’ use of the internet.1 In doing so, we can maintain a high level of research focus in evaluating whether the internet has indeed assisted these parties in Singapore to overcome the media bias and help them gain electoral leverage. Findings of such an exclusive study will allow it to be used with studies of others aspects of Singapore’s internet landscape for researchers to gain a fuller picture of its political currents. One attempt to execute such a study was undertaken by examining how political parties used the internet in the 2001 general election. According to Kluver (2004: 454), Singapore’s political culture ‘‘has a mediating effect’’ on the role of the internet and it ‘‘plays a significant role in contextualising and limiting the effects of new media on political practice.’’ The author also argued that in Singapore the centralised mode of governance and conservative political culture heavily influences the way the internet is used to mobilise political support and spread the message of opposition parties. As a result, he asserted that the opposition parties’ use of the internet has not been effective. However, Kluver’s study is based largely on a review of the features of political party websites. Furthermore, the actual reviews were limited to websites studied during the period of the 2001 elections, which were consulted again in 2003. Although Kluver (2004) disclosed the realities of Singapore’s conservative political culture, his analysis is undermined partially by the absence of primary empirical research, such as interviews with activists and opposition party figures. Without such interviews, researchers may not understand the background and reasons behind why opposition political party websites lack certain types of information or have a deficiency in some features. These, for example, may be due to difficulties in finding proper expertise in setting up or maintaining websites or in-house communication policies that prevent the internet to be used optimally as a tool of external communication. A secondary weakness of Kluver’s study is that it makes this claim without correlating his findings with the election results. However, his study marks a shift from the position of earlier researchers that internet holds external outreach potential for opposition parties to a position that the internet has not been able to provide these parties with an external Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Online Opposition in Singapore 593 Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 outreach tool that can result in a positive electoral outcome for them. Given, Kluver’s limited data set, this study seeks to build on his initial research and revalidate his claim that opposition parties’ use of websites are not effective by focusing exclusively on opposition parties and employing in-depth interviews with party officials and webmasters of opposition parties to collate information. The findings of the interviews are then correlated with Singapore general election results. In this way, the article seeks to make available an additional data set upon which other researchers could draw to help build a better understanding about opposition parties, the internet and the political landscape in Singapore. Face-to-face interviews based on a set of structured questions were conducted with representatives of opposition parties with websites between January 2005 and May 2006 in Singapore. Before conducting the interviews, the interviewees were informed about the research project and provided with information that gave an overview of the research. Each interview took at least one hour and, in most cases, required more time, sometimes requiring more than one sitting. Some follow-up questions were also sent by email. Care was taken to interview at least the webmaster or the party representatives who dealt with the party’s website. Most subjects approached were co-operative and willing to spare their time. But there was some reluctance to answer questions on incidents or disagreements over control of the party website and members’ external online communication. Hence, it was not always possible to elicit sufficient and accurate information on this topic, because those interviewed either did not have full knowledge, or were reluctant to speak about the topic. To supplement the interviews, the websites of these political parties were browsed to collect information. In addition, media reports on opposition parties and the internet between the years 1995 and 2007 were reviewed. Finally, interviews were conducted with selected journalists and academics, with a final round of interviews undertaken in February-March 2007. Also useful was a well-known digital library and archive of internet sites – www.archive.org – which was used to track and access past versions of the websites discussed in this article. Opposition Parties Go Online In January 1996, The Straits Times, a government-controlled newspaper, reported that a number of opposition parties were planning to set up websites ‘‘in time for the general election to ensure that they can publicise their platform and programmes directly to potential voters’’ (Ibrahim, 1996). The then Secretary-General of the National Solidarity Party (NSP), Yip Yew Weng, anticipated that the internet would give opposition parties another channel with which to engage with the public, and that ‘‘our press releases and comments are given to people unedited’’ (quoted in Ibrahim, 1996). The Singapore Malays National Organisation (PKMS) announced it was also planning to go online but was less ambitious, intending to start an internet account to ‘‘get a feel for the information available.’’ Its then deputy SecretaryGeneral Rahizan Yaacob said, ‘‘Keeping up with technology is a priority and we do not want to lose out’’ (quoted in Ibrahim, 1996). Opposition parties such as the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), NSP and PKMS did express an interest in early 1996 to go onto the internet in time for the general election (Ibrahim, 1996), but the NSP acted first and launched a home page on the Internet in early 1996 (The Straits 594 J. Gomez Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Times, 9 March 1996).2 The NSP’s main reason for establishing its website was to present ‘‘uncensored’’ NSP news and to present its candidates and activities during general elections. Secretary-general Yip Yew Weng, announced at the press conference to mark the launch of the website, ‘‘Under the present political system, political information has always been censored, edited or even completely rejected by the press . . . By going into the Internet, the party can represent its views in a clear and uncensored way’’ (The Straits Times, 9 March 1996). In December 1996 the SDP launched three websites ‘‘to provide voters and residents information that would help them make ‘intelligent decisions’ during General Election’’ (The Straits Times, 7 December 1996). The three websites consisted of one that belonged to the party and one each to the two town councils then under its jurisdiction (Rodan, 1998: 87). The town councils were Bukit Gombak and Nee Soon Central, and the aim of their websites was to ‘‘enable the SDP MPs to communicate directly with their residents’’ (The Straits Times, 7 December 1996). According to a statement signed by SDP chief Chee Soon Juan, the internet was, a conduit for unedited and uncensored information . . . so lacking in Singapore . . . For too long, Singaporeans have been deprived of accurate and reliable news, especially political news, on Singapore . . . With the website, the SDP will do its utmost to break the PAP’s control of the mass media in Singapore and improve the anaemic conditions of news coverage in this country (The Straits Times, 7 December 1996). Hence, the rationale for the opposition parties that first set up their websites was external outreach. The parties felt that they needed to use this new technology to overcome local media bias. Indirectly, they hoped that if the internet could help them overcome local media bias and reach out directly to the voting public, then they could gain political leverage against the ruling party in electoral terms. The SDP, after not being able to put up its elections websites in 1996 because of government prohibition and also losing two of its seats in that election, chose not to develop its own website. Instead it used the Singaporeans For Democracy Website to carry its announcements between 1997 and 2000. It was not until the run up to the 2001 general election, that the SDP established its own website. In also included an election site as part of the main site. This site listed the profiles of the SDP candidates who contested in one single-member constituency and two five-member group representative constituency. There was also some information about its five-point economic plan and another section that highlighted some key policy positions of the SDP. The website also carried the results of the contested constituencies which the SDP lost. Records obtained through www.archive.org show that the Workers’ Party (WP) website, copyrighted since 1999, carried information about the party history and its officials. The website was revamped just before the 2001 general elections. Months before the same elections, the NSP, PKMS, Singapore People’s Party (SPP) and National Solidarity Party (SJP) came to establish a formal electoral front against the PAP called the Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA).3 However, the SDA did not set up a separate website, thereby missing an opportunity to consolidate its identity in cyberspace. Instead, in 2002, following the 2001 general elections, two SDA Online Opposition in Singapore 595 member parties, the SPP and PKMS, both went online to establish their individual online presence. Nearer to the 2006 general elections there were further adjustments on the opposition parties’ web landscape. The SDP website underwent a revamp in 2005, while the SPP and NSP finalised their upgrades in 2006. The WP also undertook the development of a separate elections site to supplement its existing site in time for the 2006 general elections. In 2007, it announced the successful completion of another revision of its main website. General elections provided parties the momentum to first get online. Elections also form the timelines against which these parties later aim for ‘‘upgrades’’ and revamps of their sites. Government statistical reports and internet sources list 23 registered parties, but the ground reality is very much different. After ten years, only six opposition parties – NSP, SDP, PKMS, Singapore National Front (SNF), SPP and WP – had set up websites. By early 2006, only five of these sites were still active, with the SNF site, which had not updated since 2002, no longer having a web address in 2005 (Table 1). The SDP, SPP and WP sites were each revamped in the run up to the 2006 general elections but, overall, there were no significant increases in the number of opposition party websites. After the 2006 general elections, only the SDP and WP were active in regularly updating their sites, while the NSP and SPP updated their sites intermittently. In the meantime, the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (IDA), which conducts surveys to gauge information and communication development, revealed that in the last decade, computer ownership by households had more than doubled from 36% in 1996 to 78% in 2006. In parallel, the number of households with internet access had also grown sharply from 8.6% in 1996 to 71% in 2006 (IDA, 2006). The small number of opposition sites, to some extent, accurately reflects the number of opposition parties that have a membership base and are active in electoral terms. Further, the amount of information, the number of members involved in their activities and the volume of public participation in their activities further helps distinguish the major opposition parties from the rest. The websites also allow us to effectively reject the impression created by the PAP government statistics of 23 opposition parties; this figure is achieved by keeping defunct parties registered on paper together with the handful of opposition parties that actually operate under Singapore’s rigid rules. However, the main challenge is to explain why even the few active opposition parties that have gone online have not exploited the potential of Table 1. Opposition party websites in Singapore Party National Solidarity Party Singapore Democratic Party Singapore Malay National Organisation (PKMS) Singapore National Front Singapore People’s Party Workers’ Party Established 1996 2001 2002 2002-05 2002 1999 URL nsp-singapore.org www.singaporedemocrat.org www.geocities.com/pkms218 www.snfsingapore.cjb.net www.spp.org.sg www.wp.sg Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Source: Consolidated from interviews with opposition party webmasters and cross-checked with www.archive.org 596 J. Gomez the internet fully. Has legislation surrounding political parties’ online expression been a source of hindrance? Or are there other variables that researchers and observers need to consider? Internet Regulation and Political Parties in Singapore There are essentially two sets of legislation governing the use of the internet by political parties in Singapore. The first is the Class Licence Scheme and the second is the Parliamentary Elections Act. The Class Licence Scheme contained in the Broadcasting Act was introduced by the then Singapore Broadcasting Authority (SBA) (now Media Development Authority or MDA4) barely six months after it was reported that a number of opposition parties were exploring the use of websites for elections. Under this Scheme ‘‘all political parties, religious organisations, and other organisations and individuals with Web pages discussing religion or politics must register with the SBA’’ (quoted in Rodan, 1998: 80-1). The MDA regulatory framework, which is contained in the Broadcasting (Class Licence) 2001, elaborates that, An Internet Content Provider who is or is determined by the Authority to be a body of persons engaged in the propagation, promotion or discussion of political or religious issues relating to Singapore on the World Wide Web through the Internet, shall register with the Authority within 14 days after the commencement of its service, or within such longer time as the Authority may permit (Broadcasting Act, 2005, Chapter 28, Section 9). Under this requirement, websites of political parties are required, through notice in writing, to register as political sites. The stipulated objective of registering political websites is to ‘‘ensure’’ that those who run sites engaging in the discussion of domestic politics are accountable and take responsibility for the content of their sites. Registration is touted as a simple administrative procedure. It requires content providers such as political parties to give MDA the particulars of the website and those who are responsible for the editorial content. Such details are requested of political parties every year. Known as ‘‘Registration Form B for Class Licensable Broadcasting Services,’’ licensees (in this case political parties registered in Singapore) are to comply with strict conditions: examples include giving MDA ‘‘14 days prior written notice before terminating its provision of the website(s)’’; MDA is also to be notified: ‘‘7 days in advance of any change in the nature of the website(s)’’ and ‘‘no later than 7 days after any change in the editor(s), editorial teams(s), web publisher(s) or web host(s)’’, as well as ‘‘no later than 14 days after any other change in the information provided’’ in the registration form. Other details that reveal the depth of information required by the government are found in an annexure to the form which requires particulars about each party website, including the commencement date of the parties’ website, subscription rates charged, IP address, title in English and other languages, and languages that the websites’ contents are in. It goes further by requiring registrants to ‘‘state nature of content in detail and indicate target audience,’’ name and contact details of the ‘‘Web Publisher (the person or organization responsible for producing and packaging the website)’’ and the ‘‘Web Host (the person or organization who owns Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Online Opposition in Singapore 597 the server on which the website is carried or hosted, if different from Web Publisher).’’ Not least, the MDA also makes both the Central Executive Committee (or equivalent) of the political party and the entire editorial team of a website responsible for its content: they have to sign a declaration in which they jointly register the websites and agree to ‘‘accept full responsibility for the contents on the website(s) and shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that such contents comply with the laws of Singapore.’’ The imposition of these conditions is to ensure that both the political executives of the party and the appointed editors of the sites are held accountable, even though some executive committee members may have nothing to do with the daily running of the site. In some ways it is similar to guidelines that regulate the working of party publications, where clear lines of legal accountability mean that representatives of the ruling PAP can use defamation laws against selected opposition parties and members that can put all executive committee members and the party at financial risk, facing bankruptcy and a jail term (see Gomez, 2006a). This was the case in the ‘‘Tamil Language Week’’ article in the WP newspaper The Hammer in 1995 and in the SDP’s New Demokrat in 2006 that resulted in the party leaders being sued, declared bankrupt and, in the case of J. B. Jeyaretnam, then Secretary-General of the WP, the loss of his parliamentary seat (see Gomez, 2006a).5 We will see later in this article that Low Thia Khiang, the current leader of the WP, also raises this point when he explains the rationale for imposing restrictions on the participation of WP Central Executive Committee (CEC) members at internet forums (Kwek and Peh, 2006c). Hence the Class Licence Scheme creates a sense of caution among party leaders that the internet might open a vulnerable front towards them or individual members of the CEC, especially if they are elected as member of parliament (who, if made bankrupt, can lose their parliamentary seat) or affect the party as a whole. Although the Class Licence Scheme compelled political parties to register and had a ‘‘psychological effect’’ it did not curb the day-to-day online activities of political parties in any way. It was the Parliamentary Elections Act that was employed actively to reel in the online campaign activities of opposition parties during elections. In late 1996, the opposition parties which had gone online faced their first obstacle during the run up to the 1997 elections. In December 1996, the NSP posted information about its candidates on its site which it had set up earlier in the year. As already highlighted, the SDP launched three websites which also contained the biodata of its candidates. After the candidate nomination day for the general election on January 1997 the SBA told the SDP and the NSP to remove the bio-data and posters of its election candidates because it had ‘‘contravened some parts of the Parliamentary Elections Act’’ (The Straits Times, 29 December 1996), and that the rules did not provide for campaigning on the internet, although it did not prohibit it either (Rodan, 1998: 87). The SBA faxed the then NSP president Tan Chee Kien’s office on 28 December asking him to remove all information about the party’s candidates from its website by 1 p.m. (The Straits Times, 29 December 1996). According to NSP Secretary-General Steve Chia, the SBA gave notice to the NSP because the party was deemed to have gone beyond the accepted limits of the party’s constituency when using the internet for election advertising. The election campaign rules stated that campaign materials for a particular constituency should be located Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 598 J. Gomez within the boundaries of the targeted constituency. However, the website’s virtual outreach beyond the geographical boundary of the constituency was seen as contravening the campaign rules.6 What was interesting was that the laws were either unclear or silent about internet campaigning at that time, and it was up to political actors like the SDP and the NSP to explore options such as using the internet for outreach. However, the PAP government chose to restrict the use of the internet for election campaigning. In 2001 amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act were introduced to provide some clarity to online campaigning. New legislation governing online campaigning by political parties was introduced via amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Act that came into effect on 17 October 2001. The amendments stipulated the types of ‘‘election advertising’’ and used a very broad definition of election advertising to include all material that ‘‘can reasonably be regarded’’ to help secure the electoral success of any political party or candidate, or to improve the standing of any of these parties or candidates (The Straits Times, 14 August 2001). As well as stating what was allowed and what was disallowed, the amended rules included a ban on non-party political websites from campaigning. The amendments allow websites belonging to political parties to: publish posters, manifestos, candidate profiles, party profiles and publications; calls for members, volunteers or canvassers; send emails promoting or opposing a party or candidate; post notices of meetings or constituency visits; open chat rooms and discussion forums; as well as post hypertext links to sites without election advertising or with permitted forms of election advertising. The features that are specifically disallowed are election surveys during the election period, appeals for election funds and ‘‘facilities allowing visitors to search the site for disallowed forms of election advertising’’ (Tan, 2001). Moderators had to be appointed for chat rooms and discussion forums during the election and logs of all messages had to be maintained. The amendments also established very specific rules which require that when political parties, candidates and their election agents send out emails and SMS messages containing ‘‘election advertising’’ during an election, they ‘‘must indicate who is sending the messages and on whose behalf they are sent,’’ and such messages must not be in the form of a ‘‘chain-letter’’ that asks the receiver to pass them on to others (Tan, 2001). The rules were to be in force during the election period; from the time the ‘‘writ of election’’ is issued until the close of the last polling station on polling day. For this period also, non-party political sites are prohibited from carrying party banners and candidate profiles, as well as publishing campaign materials or running election advertisements (Tan, 2001; The Straits Times, 14 August 2001). Election advertising is banned on polling day and this applies to advertising on the internet as stated in Section 78B of the Act (The Straits Times, 14 August 2001). Although the Parliamentary Elections Act amendments made online campaigning legal, the take up rate was actually low and the features employed on political party sites were basic. The change in law did not significantly motivate opposition parties to rush towards an online presence. For instance, the SDP was the only opposition party having a website that also contained a sub-site specifically covering the 2001 elections.7 There were no major infringements in the run up to the November 2001 general elections except that the WP received an express delivery letter in October 2001 from the Elections Department asking them to remove a page containing a request for political donations. As noted above, soliciting funds for election purposes Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Online Opposition in Singapore 599 online was excluded by the amendments to the Act. The WP not only removed the page, it also launched their revamped website – without that page – not long after the notice was given (The Straits Times, 21 October 2001). While not amending the law for the 2006 elections, about a month before the general elections, the PAP government ‘‘clarified’’ that the existing rules would continue to affect internet electioneering. In particular, it identified podcasts and vodcasts as not being among the ‘‘positive list’’ of regulations passed in 2001 that forbid the streaming of ‘‘explicit political content’’ by political parties or individuals (The Straits Times, 4 April 2006). Pictures of rallies were also not allowed to be posted (The Straits Times, 5 April 2006). The PAP government also announced that blogs that ‘‘persistently propagate, promote or circulate political issues relating to Singapore’’ might be asked to register and remove material deemed to be election advertising (Chia et al., 2006). Individual sites and blogs were required to register when the MDA asked them to do so. And during the election period those registered will not be allowed to provide material that is deemed to be election advertising (The Straits Times, 4 April 2006). It further elaborated that those likely to be compelled to be registered would be those that consistently support or criticise political parties and their candidates (The Straits Times, 5 April 2006). The rules surrounding podcasting affected the SDP which had already begun to put up podcasts sometime before the general elections. The Worker’s Party which had plans to set up podcasting decided to shelve its plans (Chia et al., 2006). Nevertheless the SDP did upload a podcast days before nomination day. Soon after, the Elections Department issued an order to remove the audio files and podcasts on the SDP website, with which it complied. Under Section 78A of the Parliamentary Elections Act, the punishment is a fine not exceeding $S1000 or a jail term of not more than 12 months or both (Lee, 2006). In response, media watch NGO, Reporters Without Borders, issued a statement denouncing the move by the Elections Department, saying that this amounted to clamping down on freedom of expression (The Straits Times, 29 April 2006). Apart from the incident surrounding the SDP podcast no other opposition website has been informed that they had breached election advertising rules in the 2006 general elections. Although the PAP government initially used the Parliamentary Election Act in 1996 to prevent opposition parties using the internet to post information about their candidates, by 2001 the Act was amended to allow for it. In 2006, however, podcasts, videocast and rally photos could not be published during an election campaign period. These rules governing online electoral campaigning place certain restrictions on parties during the electoral campaign period. When it comes to day-to-day operations, there were no restrictions, except the requirement for pre-registration. Yet, many opposition parties were slow in setting up their websites and did not exploit those features that were not forbidden during the election period (or even during non-elections times). So if the legislation was not what held back the full exploitation of the internet by opposition parties, what did? The ‘‘Do-It-Yourself’’ Approach The various opposition parties share common ground in that their website developments were driven by individual youth members, all aged in their twenties Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 600 J. Gomez and thirties, who were generally information technology-savvy, personally motivated and willing to try new ideas. The initial stages of development were characterised by a ‘‘do-it-yourself’’ approach of design and home page construction where the day-today running of the websites were executed ‘‘in-house’’ by volunteers or members, with web hosting undertaken by a commercial company. After the initial implementation, upgrades and improvements to the websites were often completed in the run up to general elections. NSP Secretary-General Steve Chia revealed that work towards the party website began when he first proposed it at a central executive committee meeting in 1996 and encountered no resistance from the other committee members.8 The cost was relatively inexpensive – ‘‘about US$25 per month for hosting, and no set-up or design fees were involved then’’.9 Chia stated that he built the website himself using Microsoft’s ‘‘Front Page’’ as the party did not have anyone competent enough to do it.10 The ‘‘do-it-yourself’’ nature of the website was characteristic of such endeavours by all opposition parties during their start up stage. Cost was a factor because web designers then were asking for a substantial amount of money. In 1996, the NSP had to contend initially with a SGD$4000 start-up cost to design the pages, in addition to the costs of the hosting service, updating the contents and log-on time. At that time, NSP’s Secretary-General Yip Yew Weng said that these costs did not make it cheap for opposition parties to go online (quoted in Ibrahim, 1996). After its initial attempt to put up websites in late 1996 was disallowed, the SDP set up its own site in the run up to the 2001 general elections. This time the website was created by a member of its Youth Wing named Bryan Lim. The SDP website underwent a revamp in 2005. The new site was built by internet activist Yap Keng Ho, on a voluntary basis, with the hosting of the site by a Singapore internet company.11 Yap was behind the idea of podcasting for which the SDP received publicity in the local media when it launched its first internet radio broadcast in August 2005 (The Straits Times, 6 August 2005). Calling it RadioSDP, its website made downloadable podcast audio files available. The WP website was first set up in 1999 by Low Thia Khiang, then the party’s assistant Secretary-General. The site was a static one that Low designed using the Front Page program, managed it and ran its daily operations. The WP website got a shot in the arm in 2001 when Yaw Shin Leong, then 24, and James Gomez, then 36, of the Think Centre joined the party.12 Both became involved in updating the WP’s website (The Straits Times, 21 August 2001). After Yaw was appointed the webmaster in late 2001, he obtained a friend’s help to revamp the website in order to prepare for the 2001 general elections, based on a ‘‘simple’’ Content Management System.13 The WP website steadily grew in the next few years with the volunteer work of these new members, who added improvements in terms of features and content. Most of the website’s features were developed in-house during this period. Goh Meng Seng joined the WP in 2001, when he was 31 and, as a well-known internet forum participant, also contributed to the WP’s website development. In 2002, another member from Think Centre, Melvin Tan, then aged 28, joined the WP and also contributed to website development. The SPP website was developed in 2002. Party Assistant Secretary-General Desmond Lim had advocated the idea of a website due to his personal interest and background in telecommunications. Initially built by students at a SGD$500 start-up Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Online Opposition in Singapore 601 cost and SGD$20 for every update per page, as the costs accumulated, Lim eventually took over the maintenance and updating of the website himself. At one point, updating was outsourced to an external volunteer-based service, but after an incident where the site was shut down because the volunteer-based service collapsed and resulted in content updating disruption, Lim decided that a proper investment in technology was necessary and hence decided to fund some of the revamps himself. The website went through a third revamp in the run up to the 2006 general elections. There are currently three people, including Lim, managing the website.14 The PKMS website was built by party members using basic software and skills, and with a small budget.15 PKMS went online in 2002 and uses free web space provided by Yahoo! Geocities. Hence the viewer is faced with Yahoo! and Geocities pop-up advertisements on the homepage, which generally makes the site look amateurish. The SNF is a breakaway from PKMS and was registered in 1991. Its homepage is even more amateurish and poorly designed; information is meagre and the layout and features are basic and distracting. The site has not had new information uploaded to its News section since 2002. These two Malay-based parties have information both in English and Malay. Overall, the take-up rate of the internet by opposition parties was slow but steady. The more established parties with online presence carried out further upgrades. Yet, most of the upgrades were carried out by freelancers and aspiring web developers, whose low costs the opposition parties were willing to pay. For instance, the NSP website went through several revamps. Most of the technological development was initially done in-house, but the NSP eventually decided to get some professional help. The first instance was after the 1997 general election, and the next was when NSP Secretary-General Chia found an American company to host the party’s website. The company closed down within a year of the NSP contracting it, and the party approached new vendors for a revamp of their site. According to Chia, as the technology improved and websites could be built ‘‘better for cheaper,’’ those based on an active Content Management System could ‘‘now be built for less than $2000,’’ and are also ‘‘simpler and neater’’.16 Hence, the NSP settled in August 2005 for former Think Centre member Michael Cheng, a freelance web developer and designer, to construct and host its website.17 Similarly, in late 2005, the WP decided on the redevelopment of its website into a professional one by engaging a vendor. A random internet search for a number of website development companies based in Singapore, specifically requesting the use of Content Management Systems as the interface for uploading data, yielded some leads. Using this information, the party sent queries to about a dozen vendors, and seven replied, including Michael Cheng. One company, Ape Communications, had initially considered the WP’s request, but then turned it down, the contact person saying that her boss had ‘‘mentioned that the company is apolitical and would like to pull out from this project’’.18 A few vendors replied with quotations, the most expensive being SGD$15,000 from a company called Innerval Design & Print.19 Representatives from two prospective vendors, Formul8 Pte Ltd and Anhance Pte. Ltd, met with WP representatives and showed strong interest in taking up the project, even though neither had experience setting up a website for a political party. Both had previously dealt with commercial clients or with government and state agencies. The two companies eventually decided not to undertake the project, citing Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 602 J. Gomez time and scheduling conflicts.20 Finally, the WP chose Michael Cheng to complete this task, as he quoted the lowest price of SGD$2800 for the required development cost, not including the cost of web hosting.21 However, Cheng completed only part of the agreed assignment; the WP had to find a replacement developer to complete the task.22 As a result of the low level of technical expertise, lack of full-time human resources and expertise, attacks from hackers and domain name hijacking became another source of problems for opposition party sites. In late June 2001, the NSP reported that hackers had infiltrated one of its mail lists hosted on Yahoo! groups and deleted some 8000 names. It speculated that the culprits hacked into the webmaster’s personal computer and accessed his password (Agence France Presse, 28 June 2001). In December 2002, the WP website proved vulnerable to hackers when it sustained an attack on its server’s web manager. This attack was part of a world-wide attack on all ‘‘worker’s party’’ sites that saw the index page of the site defaced by the cartoon character ‘‘Smurf.’’ This prompted the party’s webmasters to set up web security and use firewalls to prevent remote access to login information on their personal computers. In June 2003, it was reported that the SDP website hosted on the URL www.singaporedemocrats.org was turned into a pornographic website called Mature Sex (The Straits Times, 18 June 2003). According to inside sources, the SDP had failed to renew it web address, leaving its domain name open to ‘‘hijack.’’ This can happen if websites do not pay their bills to the web host on time, even by one day. Anyone who has been monitoring the situation can then detect it and make the purchase at the point of expiry. In the case of the SDP site, the old domain name uploaded with the words ‘‘Mature Sex’’ and weeks later it was built into a fee-paying pornographic site. Investigations by the SDP to trace the owner of the domain name revealed that it was registered to a Polish person who, when contacted, refused to give up the domain name. In a press release on 17 January 2003, the party asked, ‘‘The question is why would a Pole want to take over a domain name from an opposition party in Singapore?’’ (Singapore Democratic Party, 2003a). To overcome this problem the party then had to purchase a different domain name. It did so by dropping the ‘‘s’’ in the word ‘‘democrats.’’ The new domain name is www.singaporedemocrat.org. Records reviewed in mid-2007 at www.archive.org showed that from May 2005 the website ‘‘Mature Sex’’ was no longer hosted on the old domain name www.singapore democrats.org but that the domain name was not available for registration. Less than a year later, the SDP site was to suffer further problems when users could not connect from the static pages to the automated pages in August 2003. According to SDP Secretary-General Chee Soon Juan, the party website was hacked and disrupted for the second time (The Straits Times, 14 August 2003). The SDP on its website on 16 August 2003 said its files had been modified and hacked into to cause a malfunction (Singapore Democratic Party, 2003b). It took the party about a week to get the site back on track. Although this incident was again reported as hacking, one informed observer noted that it was more likely that the PHP programming that the website was using had ‘‘bugs,’’ thereby causing PHP-enabled pages to crash or the SDP site lost PHP support from the web host.23 Hence, both from a mischief-making viewpoint as well as a technical viewpoint, opposition sites are especially vulnerable to web-related problems. Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Online Opposition in Singapore 603 Overall, the do-it-yourself approach of opposition parties in Singapore kept the website features of their sites basic, making them susceptible to technical problems and hacking. Additionally, with the absence of sufficient funding and other resources, notably full-time and qualified webmasters, most parties could not even fully utilise the features permitted by law. Hence, the parties lacked the resources to harness the full potential of the internet. In many instances, party leaders who do not have any particular communications expertise have attempted to direct the party’s online outreach. However, this was only part of the problem. Another reason why opposition party website development is limited has to do with the Singaporean political culture of caution that follows from the laws of content accountability. The registration process required by the Class Licence Scheme of political parties makes those responsible clearly identifiable, hence accountable in the case of defamation suits. This leads to extreme caution when it comes to online communications. Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 A Culture of Caution During interviews, all party members connected to the website of their parties noted that there is certain level of discomfort towards online communications. All have mentioned some kind of internal opposition by older and more conservative members in their respective leaderships. This is in part due to a mixture of factors such as over-caution based on traumatic political experiences that have resulted in defamation suits, as highlighted earlier in the case of the WP and SDP. Additionally, anxieties about the clarity of regulations governing internet usage by political parties, as well as a technological divide between the more conservative, older members and the younger, more information technology-savvy and intrepid members of each party contribute towards this problem. For instance, the SDP site acts as an online news site by uploading original content about its civil disobedience activities and its numerous legal cases, including prison experiences. Providing this kind of content is entirely different from the content of other parties, which is limited to party information, statements and press releases. Through interviews, this researcher learnt that the SDP is able to do this because the editorial team and those updating the website are a small core of people that includes members of the central committee, ordinary members and volunteers who believe in this kind of content provision.24 Hence, the SDP is the only party actively using more advanced features of the internet, for instance podcasting, through its website to disseminate their party message and publicise interviews with party leaders. In late 2006, the SDP also began using videocasts, taking advantage of the easy upload features of YouTube. Other parties generally tend to be more rigid, preferring to upload strictly factual information about their parties and its activities. The internal functioning and management of opposition parties are generally kept away from the public and are not known to researchers who do not have direct contact with opposition representatives. But one incident that came into the public attention following resignations from the WP over the party’s attempts to control its members’ online communication, can provide some more public verification of internal differences over the control of party website content. In late 2006, two WP CEC members quit over the party’s guidelines to curtail members’ forum postings on the internet. Goh Meng Seng was reported as saying 604 J. Gomez that he had quit over the bad image he had caused to the party through his postings at internet forums (see Kwek and Peh, 2006a). Barely two weeks after his resignation, the WP introduced internet conduct guidelines for its CEC members and this prompted Chia Ti Lik also to resign from the CEC and the party in protest (Kwek and Peh, 2006b). Because of the public nature of this resignation, the WP leadership responded through the local media, stating that it had imposed guidelines on its CEC members from participating in internet forums in their own names because such forums should be for lay people and not for card-carrying members (Kwek and Peh, 2006c). However, WP leader, Low Thia Khiang’s explanation highlighted more pertinent reasons: ‘‘Caution must be exercised by party members to avoid libel suits, he said. If a party member issues a public statement and is sued for defamation, everyone is implicated, not just the one person’’ (as cited in Kwek and Peh, 2006c). This view was not shared by Chia, who resigned arguing that being too cautious amounted to ‘‘paying lip service’’ to the call for alternative view, checks and balances. He lamented, ‘‘The opposition at the moment does not live up to its role. It is too silent or too restrained in its criticism of the Government’’ (quoted in Kwek and Peh, 2006c). This WP incident was not something that emerged suddenly; the issue of control over the party and its members’ online communication had been brewing for sometime.25 Ever since the WP had an injection of net-savvy young members who contributed towards its website development and external communications, these younger members almost unilaterally took the lead in getting the message on the net. As a result, in the preceding several years, at several of its CEC meetings the WP had internally introduced and amended internet guidelines to centralise control. It also appointed webmasters who had to go through a tiered approval process and, at times, needed a final clearance from Secretary-General Low Thia Khiang before posting information on the internet. In two party newsletters to members in September 2006, the WP explained that only authorised personnel from the party could photograph or film public outreach activities. Further, if members wanted to upload photos onto their blogs, the party permitted only those published on the WP website (Workers Party of Singapore, 2006a, 2006b). This is clear evidence of the WP’s desire to control and frame how external outreach is conducted online by its members. However, there is a tension within the party with regards to members’ public online communications. Younger WP members continue to participate in internet chat rooms using nicknames (even though the chatroom participants can guess who are the WP members), manage news aggregating sites and maintain personal blogs. Others have banded together to set up The Hammersphere: The unofficial WP supporters’ blog (hammersphere.wordpress.com) with the caveat, The Hammersphere does not represent the official Workers’ Party nor does it represent the party’s official views on issues or policies. All views, opinions and expressions on this blog are solely and purely personal to the author/s and does not, in any way, shape or form, represent that of the Workers’ Party. If we look back further to the WP’s web history, we can also note the cautiousness related to the use of the internet. Although the WP website from 1999 did carry Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Online Opposition in Singapore 605 Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 appeals for funds to help then WP Secretary-General J. B. Jeyaretnam, when he faced bankruptcy charges, many of the articles related to his legal cases, even while he was still the Secretary-General, were carried on the Singaporeans for Democracy (SFD) site. In addition, other information such as the launch of his books was also carried by the SFD site. The Singapore-Window website also carried a more comprehensive archive of articles and reviews of Jeyaretnam’s legal cases and other related matters since 1997 under the header ‘‘Jeyaretnam trials and tribulations’’ (www.singaporewindow.org/jeyapage.htm). When the Think Centre started its operations it too started to carry information and press releases from Jeyaretnam. More Jeyaretnamspecific information was carried on the Think Centre site when he stepped down as Secretary-General of the WP in 2001. These events show even that the news surrounding Jeyaretnam’s legal battles connected with WP political activities where not carried on the WP website then under the direction of Low Thia Khiang. A principal reason for the caution shown in these cases of the use of the internet as a tool for external communication is the fear of defamation suits. As we saw earlier, the internet registration guidelines make the whole CEC and all web editorial personnel liable for the content on the website. Further, if a party has an elected MP, the prospect of he or she losing their seat through possible financial loss and bankruptcy proceedings make the caution more acute. Additionally, most opposition political parties are held back by tensions between older and more conservative members who are less open to new communication technology, while the younger members are more willing to experiment and take risks. Even when there is support, the use of the internet by opposition political parties is often dependent on the capacity of young members within the opposition movement to take the lead and push the idea through. Given the above issues, did the internet fulfil the initial hope the opposition parties placed on it as tool of external communication? In this context, what have the consequences been on the electoral fortunes of the opposition political parties that had gone online? Impact on Electoral Results Overall, in electoral terms there has been no real impact ever since the opposition parties started to go online in 1996. For instance, in terms of votes cast for the various opposition parties that had websites leading up to the 1997 general elections, there seems to be no correlation in the rise and fall of their share of the valid votes cast in their favour. For the SDA, whose component parties that have a website are the NSP, SPP and PKMS, their combined vote has been edging up in low single-digit percentage points. The SDP’s share of votes, on the other hand, has been constantly declining, even though it had a web presence after the 1997 general election at the SFD website and, later, on its own website from 2001. For the WP, its website was set up in 1999, yet its vote fluctuated drastically (Table 2). Therefore, there is no singular voter share pattern that holds all the opposition parties together in connection to their website usage. The wide discrepancies between parties become clearer if we look at the number of parliamentary seats (both single and group constituency seats) contested by opposition parties with websites (Table 3). For the SDA, their combined seats have steadily risen and this, to some extent, is reflected in small gradual increases in the 606 J. Gomez Table 2. Percentage of votes for opposition parties with websites Party Singapore Democratic Alliance National Solidarity Party Singapore People’s Party Singapore Democratic Party Workers’ Party 1997 – 6.7 2.3 10.6 14.2 2001 12.0 — — 8.1 3.0 2006 13.0 — — 4.1 16.3 Source: Compiled from Singapore’s Elections Department website. Table 3. Number of parliamentary seats contested by opposition parties with websites Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Party Singapore Democratic Alliance National Solidarity Party Singapore People’s Party Singapore Democratic Party Workers’ Party 1997 — 7 3 12 14 2001 13 — — 11 2 2006 20 — — 7 20 Source: Compiled from Singapore’s Elections Department website. percentage points of total number of votes casts in its favour. In the case of the SDP, the drop in the valid votes cast for the party corresponds with the drop in the number of seats it had contested. It has also been the party that has been under the harshest political attack by the ruling PAP in the last three elections. The WP’s fluctuations in votes received can also be linked to the number of seats contested. Other factors include the departure of Jeyaretnam, changes in leadership and election administration lapses that disqualified five candidates from contesting the 2001 general elections. Again, there is no clear pattern between all parties in terms of how the total number of candidates fielded can be correlated to website presence. In fact, political issues more than website presence affect the rise and fall in the number of opposition party candidates fielded in the last three general elections. In spite of the fluctuations in the total number of candidates fielded, the sum total of opposition parties seats gained in parliament has remained unchanged. The WP has had only one seat in 1997, 2001 and 2006, each time from the same constituency. Similarly, the SDA’s component party SPP has had 1 seat each time also from the same constituency (Table 4). If we look at the percentage of votes achieved in the seats won, again the fluctuations appear not to point to any pattern related to internet profiles and presence (Table 5). A change in the prime minister and the public’s general dissatisfaction with the PAP government over the rising costs of living have been the main contributing factors in accounting for fluctuations in support. Even in terms of the non-constituency seats, no seat changes can be linked meaningfully to the various parties’ online presence. The WP had one seat in both the 1997 and 2006 elections, while the NSP picked up this seat in 2001 (Table 6). Online Opposition in Singapore Table 4. Number of opposition seats in parliament Party Singapore Democratic Party Singapore People’s Party (SDA) Workers’ Party 1997 0 1 1 2001 0 1 1 607 2006 0 1 1 Source: Compiled from Singapore’s Elections Department website. Table 5. Percentage of votes for opposition seats in parliament Party Singapore People’s Party (Potong Pasir) Workers’ Party (Hougang) 1997 55.2 58.0 2001 52.4 55.0 2006 55.8 62.7 Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Source: Compiled from Singapore’s Elections Department website. Table 6. Number of non-constituency seats in parliament Party Singapore Democratic Alliance Singapore Democratic Party Workers’ Party 1997 — 0 1 2001 1 (NSP) 0 0 2006 0 0 1 Source: Complied from Singapore’s Elections Department website. The bottom line is that ten years after the internet was adopted by several of Singapore’s opposition parties, it has not significantly altered the electoral fortunes of the opposition parties, even though internet usage had increased substantially to include up to 71% of the population in 2006 (IDA, 2006). Conclusions When Singapore’s opposition parties went online they had one principal expectation; they felt the medium would allow them to put their information directly to voters. By presenting their information directly to voters, they felt it would increase their chances during the elections. Did the internet allow opposition parties external outreach? The opposition parties were certainly able to attract external attention to the information they put out on their websites. As we can see from the incidents cited in this article, the first and foremost were the regulatory authorities. There is certainly ample evidence that they were monitoring the opposition websites and actively regulating them, especially with regards to election advertising, as in the case of the NSP and SDP in 1997, the WP in 2001 and the SDP again in 2006 over the issue of uploading a podcast. The ruling PAP also took into account the information that opposition parties had on their website and used it to attack opponents. For instance, in 2004, in 608 J. Gomez arguments about the circumstances behind Chee Soon Juan’s absence at a court hearing during which the PAP’s so-called Mentor Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong sought $US500,000 in damages from Chee for libel, website information was included. The SDP posted an article entitled, ‘‘Just who is avoiding whom?’’ to make information about the discrepancies in a change of dates by the courts available to the public. Davinder Singh, the lawyer for Lee and Goh and himself also a PAP MP, stated in court that, ‘‘These scandalous attacks [referring to the SDP postings] were published on the SDP website for the world to read and repeat. They were designed to attract maximum attention’’ (as quoted in Chia, 2004). At this stage we do not know whether the SDP website notices posted since 2003 were indeed effective, as claimed by Singh, or whether they reached a large number of people. But, by revealing its exasperation over what was being posted onto the SDP website, the PAP indirectly draws attention to its anxiety over what the internet is now offering the opposition. For instance, the SDP video clip entitled ‘‘CSJ’s Message From Prison’’ added to YouTube in November 2006 had nearly 12,000 hits by May 2007 (www.youtube.com/watch?v¼ZnLqpYupQfg). Until the arrival of the internet, the PAP government had complete control over all forms of media in Singapore, but the internet appears to have removed this monopoly and introduced a new equation into the media landscape. Information that previously was unavailable for public scrutiny in the mainstream media is now posted on the internet. While these are unintended outcomes of going online, are there other developments that are closer to the initial aspirations of the opposition parties? Interviews with journalists and former journalists from the Singapore media revealed that more young journalists are turning to the internet, for instance to opposition party websites for information; however, the problem is the quality of information.26 Several journalists indicated that the presence of the opposition websites does not increase accessibility to opposition parties. While elections cause journalists to access opposition parties more, the practice on a day-to-day basis is low. The fundamental problem with opposition party websites is that they only have basic information. Journalists say that opposition parties in Singapore have a fear of revealing too much.27 Whether a party website is effective depends on its content. A website can provide a basic introduction to new visitors who want to know about a party and want to keep track of a party’s events and activities. It is an avenue for a party to share its news and views with the public. This is the main use of websites by most of the opposition parties. The general issue with these websites is that they are quite static. As the parties do not engage journalists or the public on matters of concern frequently enough, they do not have sufficient new content to attract visitors to their site. Unless the website carries information that is a primary news source raising attention of certain events, issues or statements regarding the party, visitors, journalist and the public alike are not likely to visit the party website to find out the details. The root cause is that the party leadership, contrary to initial claims, does not want to seek publicity or does not have the desire to raise socio-political issues in a rigorous manner. The reason for this is a fear of political reprisals that may lead to bankruptcy suits. Hence, a political culture of self-censorship pervades party internet usage. This feature needs to be taken into account in any analysis of politics and the Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Online Opposition in Singapore 609 internet in Singapore. Additionally, researchers need to note that unlike online groups, which are loosely organised and bloggers who operate independently (see Gomez 2006b), opposition party communication is controlled centrally. Thus, party sites operate within the parameters set by the respective party leadership. On the other hand, citizen journalists do not have the same constraints as a political party, hence they are much freer to exploit the political potential of the internet. The SDP is the only opposition party that adopts a different approach. It eagerly seeks publicity and exploits any current and ‘‘hot’’ issues to confront the PAP. The website is a very important tool for it to post news on miscarriages of justice, human rights abuses, civil disobedience acts, etc. Because of this high profile news, commentaries and press statements, the SDP website is content rich and updated frequently to attract frequent visitors. For instance, its postings on YouTube generate a high number of hits. While the SDP may attract visitors to its website, it does not necessarily translate into material support, such as membership, or into electoral gains for candidates. For instance, we saw from the information presented in the previous section, the number of candidates the SDP has fielded in the last general election fell. It remains to be seen how this will evolve with time and the impact it will have on SDP’s activities in the future. There is evidence that the public in Singapore is accessing opposition parties’ online information, but has it led to the kind of political impact against the ruling party that the opposition parties hoped for? Presently all opposition parties put up a mixture of notices for membership recruitment and volunteers, messages of support from members of the public, announcements for candidate recruitment, run online polls and ask for feedback. As a result, the major opposition parties have began to claim that the internet has helped boost membership and supporters. Further, the use of websites to post even this basic news and press statements, sometimes does have the effect of forcing the local media to cover stories it might otherwise skip. But, in spite of this form of outreach, the kind of impact on the electoral outcome the opposition parties had hoped the internet will provide has not been forthcoming. The use of the internet by the opposition parties has allowed them to achieve some limited outreach. However, this outreach has not resulted in any significant electoral advantage. The issue remains that opposition parties are not able to put out alternative information in a timely and efficient way. It also shows that a culture of caution keeps the use of the internet in check. Even when they do put out information, it is not clear that the public or any target audience will read and act on it. Under the current circumstances, opposition parties have not been effective in elections because what little information they managed to put out through the internet has not resulted in significant electoral gains. In fact, it is unclear if the opposition parties’ online communications can even help their individual members and candidates gain the kind of national profile that will help them in the elections. Even if the use of the internet is robust, there is no guarantee that it will result in a significant change in electoral results. A population de-politicised for many years may not have the will to act even if information reaches them. In sum, opposition party websites in Singapore may be able publicise party views on certain issues and provide information about the parties, but they have not been effective in attracting the level and quality of readership that would result in an increased vote and translate into electoral gains. Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 610 J. Gomez The findings have led this article to argue that a do-it-yourself approach, technical challenges, a culture of caution and control over its members’ online communications are the chief reasons why the opposition parties’ use of the internet has been less than optimal. The parties’ use of the internet as a tool of external outreach to overcome the media bias has been achieved only in a limited way. But this outreach advantage has not translated into any significant electoral gains for the parties. Hence, the belief of earlier researchers that the internet held the potential to given opposition parties a certain electoral leverage against the ruling PAP cannot be validated. Instead, Kulver’s (2004) argument that the internet has limited political value to opposition parties can be validated in a stronger and more comprehensive way with primary data drawn from the in-depth interviews undertaken in this study and cross-referenced with general election results. It shows that relying on the internet alone does not yield electoral advantage. Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 Often, when confronted with studies that focus exclusively on opposition party politics, researchers would want such analysis to include civil society and the People’s Action Party. This is not always a good option. This article’s strength is in its special focus on opposition party websites and the politics behind them. There is very little research on opposition parties in Singapore because self-censorship and caution keep researchers away from this aspect of the city-state’s politics. However, researchers interested in similar issues related to civil society may consult Gomez (2006b). Opposition parties were not the first to go online. The Young PAP (YPAP), the youth wing of the ruling People’s Action Party, started its site in late 1994. Even the YPAP’s rationale for its website was to use it for external outreach. Its then internet committee chairman, Harold Fock was quoted as saying that there were plans to report on PAP rallies, provide pictures and snippets of events (The Straits Times, 20 January 1996). The PAP itself went online in late 2001 (Gomez, 2002: 28). It has pictures and names of the Internet Sub-Committee of the Executive Committee (Kluver, 2004: 450). It has undergone at least one design change since its inception, to include a photo gallery and a search engine. It has one central email address, phone number and fax number on its ‘‘Contact Us’’ page, in addition to the names, addresses and branch chairpersons-cum-MPs of its various constituencies. It has links to the YPAP site and websites of the town councils under its jurisdiction, as well as its Women’s Wing sub-site. The PAP also had a General Election 2001 sub-site where the Secretary-General’s message, party manifesto and party political broadcast are published online in the four official languages of English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil. In fact, the PAP does not need to use the website for these outreach purposes as they already have full access through the local mainstream media. Following the 2006 general elections, the SDA had one member in parliament (Chiam See Tong of the SPP). In 2007, after the 2006 general elections, the NSP, the component party that fielded the largest number of electoral candidates, left the SDA (Chia and Kwek, 2007). In January 2003 the SBA was merged with the Films and Publications Department and the Singapore Film Commission to form the Media Development Authority (MDA) to create a ‘‘consistent approach in developing and managing the different forms of media’’. Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam was the WP Member of Parliament from 1981 to 2001, and lost his parliamentary seat in July 2001, due to bankruptcy. The case stemmed from an incident in 1995 when a series of lawsuits were launched against him for an article in the WP newspaper (The Hammer) about an event called ‘‘Tamil Language Week.’’ Jeyaretnam was the editor of the paper where the article had claimed that five Indian PAP MPs had done nothing to promote the Tamil language. The lawsuits were brought by these PAP MPs and eleven members of the event’s Organising Committee. Jeyaretnam paid damages in full to some of the plaintiffs, but was one day late with payment to eight members of the Organising Committee. After losing a number of appeals, Jeyaretnam was declared bankrupt and stripped of his seat in Parliament. In 2007, Jeyaretnam paid a final instalment and was discharged from bankruptcy. Interview, Steve Chia, Singapore, 29 September 2005. Online Opposition in Singapore 7 8 9 10 11 12 611 13 14 15 16 17 Downloaded By: [Gomez, James] At: 14:43 10 October 2008 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 See http://www.singaporedemocrat.org/classic/informations/ge2001/index.html. Interview, Steve Chia, Singapore, 29 September 2005. Email interview, 15 October 2005. Interview, Steve Chia, Singapore, 29 September 2005. Interview, Yap Keng Ho, Singapore, 3 October 2005. Think Centre, began as an internet-based human rights NGO in 1999. For more about the Think Centre, see Gomez (2002) and George (2005). Email interview, Yaw Shin Leong, 13 October 2005. Interview, Desmond Lim, Singapore, 28 September 2005. Interview, Mohammed Rahizan, former Deputy Secretary-General, PKMS, 12 October 2005. Email interview, Steve Chia, 15 October 2005. Cheng was Think Centre’s first webmaster and built the Centre’s website. He is a self-taught internet programmer and designer and had, at various times, worked as a freelancer and attempted to set up his own company. He also developed some aspects of the PAP Youth Wing site, contributed to the websites of the now defunct Socratic Circle and other civil society organisations. Cheng is familiar with the various opposition parties and their web needs and has been willing to undertake web development assignments at fairly low costs. However, due to his freelance status, the need to juggle multiple projects and the low cost of his service, his projects for revamping the NSP and WP sites have seen delays and incompletion. Email from Ape Communications Pte. Ltd, 13 September 2005. Email from Innerval Design & Print, 20 September 2005). Emails, Formul8 Pte. Ltd, 22 September 2005; Anhance Pte. Ltd, 23 September 2005. Email from Michael Cheng, 26 September 2005. Interview, Goh Meng Seng, former central executive council member, WP, 28 February 2007. Interview, Melvin Tan, WP member, 23 October 2005. Interview, Chee Siok Chin, SDP, Seoul, Korea, 19 November 2006. Interview, Chee Siok Chin, SDP, Seoul, Korea, 19 November 2006. This information is drawn from a range of interviews with the following journalists: P. N. Balji, Former Chief Editor, TODAY (7 December 2005); G. Sivakumaran, former Project Eyeball and Straits Times journalist (6 December 2006); and Ahmad Osman, former Straits Times journalist (2 March 2007). Interviews, Sharon Vasoo, former Straits Times journalist, currently at TODAY, 7 December 2006; Lee Ching Wern, journalist, TODAY, 6 December 2006. References Agence France Presse (2001) ‘‘Hackers destroy Singapore opposition party cyber network,’’ 28 June. Broadcasting Act (2005) (Chapter 28, Section 9). Broadcasting (Class Licence) Notification [15 July 1996]. Singapore Statutes Online, http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (downloaded August 2006). Chia, S.-A., (2004) ‘‘Accusations fly between SDP chief and Senior Counsel,’’ The Straits Times, 1 October. Chia, S.-A. and K. Kwek (2007) ‘‘NSP leaves Chiam’s 4 party alliance,’’ The Straits Times, 19 January. Chia, S.-A., A. Low and S. Luo (2006) ‘‘Opposition parties slam podcast ban rule,’’ The Straits Times, 5 April. da Cunha, D. (1997) The Price of Victory: the 1997 Singapore General Election and Beyond, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. George, C. (2006) Contentious Journalism and the Internet: Towards Democratic Discourse in Malaysia and Singapore, Singapore: Singapore University Press. Gomez, J. (2002) Internet Politics: Surveillance and Intimidation in Singapore, Singapore: Think Centre. Gomez, J. (2006a) ‘‘Restricting Free Speech: The Impact on Opposition Parties in Singapore,’’ Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 23, pp. 105-31. Gomez, J. 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